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THE ANCIENT GREEK DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 
AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR TODAY'S WORLD
Heinz-Uwe Haus
Ancient Greek Drama/Theatre reinforces the idea that we have the power to shape 
and reshape our own lives and social conditions. For the performers as well as the 
spectators, to be human was to be potentially a hero of tragedy. But their unique 
interaction established the reviving tension between the “I” and the “we.” It dis-
covered how the mystery of losing heritage lies in our Self and why complexity and 
decision-making as a dialectical unit are the timeless quality that defines its char-
acters. The essay focuses on the processes regarding personal responsibility as a 
collective strength. 
 q
With the advent of the twenty-first century, many observers see evidence that the world is entering a new era of political and economic liberalism, considering whether democracy offers a 
unified system of beliefs that can be successfully applied to any setting. The 
ideals of democracy—freedom, equality, popular sovereignty—are so ap-
pealing that many different kinds of regimes pay lip service to them. Yet, the 
real issue is the machinery of government, as Jacques Barzun reminded us 
in 1989 (the year of Europe’s democratic awakening against totalitarian sup-
pression), “because it is how the wheels turn, and not the theory, that makes 
a government free or not free” (12). That machinery cannot be imported, 
Barzun argues, but rather must reflect each nation’s history and its people’s 
“habits of the heart.” Tocqueville, Rousseau, Burke, and Montesquieu come 
to mind with a proven human truth: political equality can be decreed, but 
freedom cannot. Freedom asks for the slow training of individuals by his-
tory. This element of time carries with it a predicament and a paradox. The 
predicament is “how can the peoples that want to spread freedom to the 
world propose their institutions as models to those institutions that depend 
on habits long ingrained?” and as for the paradox: “how can a people learn 
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the ways of free government until it is free? And how can it stay free if it 
cannot run the type of machinery associated with self-government?” (Barzun 
12). These modern questions are familiar to us since antiquity, whose prac-
tices and writings on government inspired thinkers to design plans or issue 
warnings appropriate to their own time.
1
“Habits of the heart” is the theme of the Greek chorus, when it presents 
the life voyages of the protagonists to an audience who steered themselves 
on collision courses with society. The ancient Athenians had begun to ques-
tion how nature worked, how society should work, and what man’s role was 
in the scheme of things. Tragedy was the poet’s answer to some of these 
questions: How should one behave? How can one accept the injustices of 
life? What is the price of hubris? The playwright’s key role is indicated by 
the term applied to him, didaskalos (teacher), for he was considered to be 
the instructor of both the performers (during the process of play production) 
and the audience (through the finished product). 
The chorus, which serves several functions, plays a most complex role in 
the performative meaning. First, it is a character in the play; it gives advice, 
expresses opinions, asks questions, and, sometimes, takes an active part in the 
action. Second, it often establishes the ethical or social framework of events 
and sets up a standard against which the action may be judged. Third, it fre-
quently serves as an ideal spectator, reacting to the events and characters as the 
dramatist might hope the audience would. Fourth, the chorus helps to set the 
overall mood of the play and of the individual scenes and to heighten dramatic 
effects. Fifth, it adds movement, spectacle, song, and dance, and thus contrib-
utes much to the theatrical effectiveness. Sixth, the choral passages serve as 
important rhythmical function, creating intervals or retardations during which 
the audience may reflect upon what has happened and what is to come. 
By performing the mythological past, the polis trained its citizen in the rec-
ognizability of history. When I discussed with Karolos Koun what impact the 
drama may have had on the theory and practice of direct democracy in an-
cient Greece, his answer was straightforward: “Its art of observation teaches 
that the ancient maxim is true: the world insists in being governed” (1975). 
Aeschylus’ Oresteia tells the legend of Agamemnon, the Greek war hero 
who was murdered by his wife Clytemnestra, and the pursuit of justice by 
Agamemnon’s children, Orestes and Electra. Thematically, the trilogy is 
about the tragedy of human arrogance or hubris—the hubris “required” to 
murder a person for personal gain, as in the case of Clytemnestra and her 
lover Aegisthus, as well as the hubris to, in turn, hunt down and kill them, 
as in the case of Orestes and Electra. When, in the end, Orestes and Electra 
are brought to trial by the Furies, vengeful emissaries of the gods, Aeschylus 
makes a point that has been echoed by historians and dramatists, psycholo-
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gists and criminal court reporters for centuries since: that the root of evil and 
suffering is, usually, human arrogance. On a dramatic level, the plays convey 
the suffering of a family torn apart by patricide and matricide. Koun’s idea 
(that is, rules of government) that the performances were a kind of “exer-
cises in historicity” implies “machinery of government,” but no rules can be 
applied universally.
As contemporary readers of Greek tragedy, we may feel that we face dif-
ferent truths than did the Greek audiences twenty-five hundred years ago. 
How, then, do we create meaning from these plays? How do we reconcile 
the tensions which exist between the fictional images of life the Greeks pre-
sented and the ongoing reality of our own lives? One way to begin is to iden-
tify particular areas in which the view of life implied in Greek tragedy differs 
from our own. The discovery that it is possible to look at life through entirely 
new eyes is in itself a kind of meaning which drama has to offer.
We live in an age in which the idea of truth is linked to the process of sci-
entific investigation. Truth is available for us, not now, but at some time in 
the future, when all the experiments have been performed and all the data 
are in. The implication of Greek tragedy, however, is that a form of truth is 
immediately available to those who are willing to face it and strong enough 
to survive. Since most mortals prefer their daily illusions, this willingness and 
strength must come from the tragic protagonist. Ancient Greek characters 
undertake extreme, audacious objectives and pursue them relentlessly to the 
point of catastrophe. Their actions help the community to face its fear of the 
implacable power of Necessity and inspire pity for the suffering which they 
must undergo in the process. If we empathize with the protagonist, we can 
vicariously test our own powers of truth-facing and survival.
2
The tragic conflict is revealed as a clash between mortal striving and a 
mysterious force in the universe which opposes such striving. Sometimes, it 
is said that Greek tragedy is about man against the gods, and it is true that a 
god may, sometimes, be the agent of negative forces. A large part of our un-
derstanding of the genre depends on the Poetics of Aristotle. The age of the 
great tragic writers was already long past when Aristotle first came to Ath-
ens. Aristotle himself pointed out that tragedy had already reached its high-
est development in the works of Sophocles and Euripides. Therefore, when 
he set out to examine the genre of tragedy—to construct a philosophical 
model for perfect tragedy, he was working with plays that had already passed 
into history. Essentially, the model that Aristotle constructed was based on 
carefully selected examples and primarily on Oedipus the King. This is not 
only an important fact in order to understand the aesthetic of Aristotle, but 
his political thinking too.
To discover why and how democracy is an ideal specifically rooted in an-
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cient Athens’ theatre, a brief examination is necessary of the most important 
aspects of Aristotle’s model. For Aristotle, the poet-dramatist is not a his-
torian but a creative artist—which means that he imitates not what actually 
happens in life, but what is probable and meaningful. He arranges events, 
not necessarily in the order of their occurrence, but in an order that is likely, 
believable, and, above all, inevitable. The poet who follows this pattern imi-
tates ideal truth, the universal which grows out of the specific. (For Aristo-
tle, this makes drama of greater import than history, which deals only with 
objective facts.)
In terms of specific form, the tragic plot must contain “reversal,” results 
opposite to those intended; “discovery,” which means the change from love 
to hate, or from ignorance to knowledge, within the play itself, with conse-
quent arousal of pity and fear (there is some justification for defining “dis-
covery” as transference of knowledge from the protagonist to the audience); 
and “suffering,” from murder, torture, or injury of the hero who passes from 
happiness to misery. The hero will not be perfectly virtuous and just, since, 
if he were, the tragic happening would be unfair; and he will not be evil or 
base, since the tragic event would then be only poetic justice. Instead, he will 
be a basically good person of distinguished standing (so that his fall will be 
greater), and his downfall will come about because of a flaw in his character. 
This flaw may be an excess of some virtue.
The Aristotelian position outlined above is certainly not a final or com-
pletely accurate depiction of Greek tragedy; of the plays that we have, it fits 
completely only Oedipus the King. It does provide a model however—a pat-
tern against which we can measure the existing plays, and a reasonably clear 
statement of exactly what the ancient Athenians got from their tragedies. 
First of all, Sophocles’ plays are about the folly of arrogance and the wisdom 
of accepting fate. Sophocles believed in the Greek gods, but his plays are 
suffused with existential insights that have been voiced many times since. For 
instance, compare this observation by Antigone in Sophocles homonymus 
play:
What joy is there in day repeating day,
some short, some long, with death the only end.
I think them fools who warm their hearts with
the glow of empty hopes. 
with Macbeth’s famous speech:
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
to the last syllable of recorded time;
and all our yesterdays have lighted fools
the way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life’s but a walking shadow; a poor player,
tefxos 22-2014.indd   16 18/02/2015   11:42:58
The Ancient Greek Democratic Ideal / 17 /
that struts and frets his hour upon stage,
and then is heard no more: It is a tale
told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
signifying nothing. (Mac. 5.5)
The drama competitions at the City Dionysia demonstrate the need for dia-
logue to meet changing conditions in the society. The performances aim to 
achieve understanding from a variety of perspectives, standards, and criteria 
that people apply in their defense and criticism of judgment. It is the theatre 
where the ancient Greeks cultivated the idea that political institutions must 
respect differences and allow many different visions of what is good to be 
expressed within the bounds of civility and public order. But any attempt 
to understand and interpret a play text mainly on the grounds of meaning 
on the verbal level ignores a basic structural principle which assumes that 
the meaning of the parts is imbued and, finally, determined by the structure 
of the whole. It should be born in mind that the same words may indicate 
very different acts/actions when reflecting different intentions and purposes. 
Unfortunately, access to the original “performance text,” which should be 
conceived as the whole, is restricted by the “literary text,” which lacks the 
nonverbal elements necessary to determine the performative function of the 
words.
Ancient Greek drama called and calls for the working out of decision-
making processes, discussion, or dialogic situations that will allow actors and 
audience to establish acceptable procedures for tackling controversial moral 
or value issues. With the Bacchae, it was Euripides’ intention to perform 
an act of harsh criticism of contemporaneously held beliefs, with the clear 
purpose of creating a conflict between the cruel nature of Dionysus and a 
sense of true divinity, against the background of expectations for a new and 
more rationa conceptualization of life. Agave’s anagnorisis of her horren-
dous deed and her profound sorrow do not constitute a recognition of the 
god’s “conjunction of opposites,” but rather convey a sense of contradiction 
to Dionysus’ alleged divinity.
3.
“So it was that humankind lost the ancient concept, dating back at least 
to the Greeks in the Western tradition, that society has a purpose that is 
something more than establishing the ground rules for individual striving,” 
Harrington reflects, comparing today’s democracies’ struggle for democrati-
zation with the Athenian vision of a participatory, non-bureaucratic democ-
racy (34). Others, like Michael Novak, reject the premodern concept of the 
common good for a modern free society. For Aristotle, the common good 
was what all things aim at; it had primacy over persons. But embracing the 
dignity of free persons does not mean that the concept of the common good 
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must be jettisoned. It means, rather, that this concept must be revised. And 
here liberalism, in the classical sense, has proved essential. Liberalism has 
provided the kind of institutions most suitable to the “person-qua-person,” 
as Novak puts it; in doing so, it has achieved a “practical reconciliation of the 
common good with the free person” (57).
But let us remember for a moment what the political ideals and aims of 
the Athenian democracy are. In The Politics, Aristotle points out that one 
basic principle of the democratic constitution is liberty. To Aristotle, liberty 
means two things: (1) “ruling and being ruled in turn,” and (2) “living as 
one chooses” (37). As such, liberty and equality are “inextricably linked.” In 
fact, the first element of liberty, “ruling and being ruled in turn,” is based on 
a fundamental conception of equality, which Aristotle labels as “numerical 
equality” (opposed to “equality based on merit”) (37). “Numerical equality” 
means an equal share of the practice of ruling for all regardless of individual 
ability, merit, or wealth. “Thus understood, equality is the practical basis of 
liberty. It is also the moral basis of liberty” (Held 50). 
However, Aristotle was aware, that a strict adherence to the doctrine of 
political equality could endanger individual’s liberty to “live as one chooses.” 
The Athenian democrats believed that there must be limits to individual 
choices so that one’s exercise of free will would not interfere unjustly with 
other people’s freedom. As long as each citizen has the opportunity of “rul-
ing and being ruled in turn,” the risk associated with equality can be mini-
mized and both elements of liberty can be realized. On Aristotle’s account, 
then, Ancient Greek “democracy entails liberty and liberty entails strict 
political equality—a matter which caused him to express grave reservations 
about democracy” (Held 50).
Society, far from being a “perfect community,” as Aristotle said, must 
stand the tension between natural law and history. In a famous passage of 
his Rhetoric, Aristotle put it in this way:
Justice and injustice have been defined in reference to laws and persons in 
two ways. Now there are two kinds of laws, particular and general. By particu-
lar laws I mean those established by each people in reference to themselves, 
which again are divided into written and unwritten; by general laws I mean 
those based upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in 
accordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, even if there is nei-
ther communication nor agreement between them. This is what Sophocles’ 
Antigone evidently means when she declares that it is just, though forbidden, 
to bury Polynices, as being naturally just: “For neither to-day nor yesterday, 
but from eternity, these statutes live and no man knoweth whence they came. 
(1373b)
Let us briefly recall the context of these words. Aristotle is analyzing the 
different parts of rhetoric: deliberative, forensic, epideictic (that is, oratory 
that deals with praise or blame). The opposition between written particular 
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law, on the one hand, and unwritten general law, on the other, takes place 
within the section on forensic rhetoric. Aristotle does not bother to demon-
strate the existence of unwritten law: he takes it is natural and, therefore, 
self-evident. The Greek scholars among us know that the translation is not 
quite correct; it is sexist by eliminating the neuter terms Aristotle is using 
(“nobody” and “all” instead of “men” and “man”). This is not a minor detail, 
because, with Antigone, a feminine character speaks the voice of general-
ity; on the contrary, the written law, in the name of which Creon forbids 
the burial of Polynices, is, in Aristotle’s words, a “particular law.” Natural 
law, as those neuter terms emphasize, embraces both men and women. But 
Aristotle seems to suggest that what is “based upon nature” is unrelated to 
specific times and places. 
Yet, some passages of the second book of his Rhetoric suggest a different 
view. Aristotle examines in detail the different emotions used by the ora-
tor in order to convince his audience. Pity, for instance: “... the nearness 
of the terrible makes men pity. Men also pity those who resemble them in 
age, character, habits, position, or family; for all such relations make a man 
more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well” (1386a). 
We come across the same argument in the section about envy: people envy 
those who are near to them in time, place, age, and reputation, whence it 
was said “[k]inship knows how to envy also,” and those with whom they 
are in rivalry, who are those just spoken of; for no man tries to rival those 
who lived ten thousand years ago, or are about to be born, or are already 
dead; nor those who live near the Pillars of Hercules; nor those who, in his 
own opinion or in that of others, are either far inferior or superior to him 
(139ff).
In Aristotle’s view, the emotions analyzed in the second book of Rhetoric 
are “undoubtedly” based upon nature. But he submitted them, as we would 
say today, to specific historical and geographical limitations. The outreaching 
metaphors—“ten thousand years” and “Pillars of Hercules”—suggest a time, 
either past or future, so remote as to prevent us from identifying, either in a 
negative or in a positive way, with the emotions of other human beings. And 
here is the connection to the “ancient concept” Michael Harrington (34) and 
others see lost in today’s realization of democracy, which emphasizes liberal 
individualism. 
Men and women, Aristotle said in The Politics, are “drawn together by a 
common interest, in proportion as each attains a share in the good life”—
but people are also moved by a desire “to live a social live even when they 
stand in no need of mutual support”; thus, the aim of the polis (of the city, 
of the government) “is not mere life, it is rather, a good quality of life” (37). 
It is not enough that “the law becomes a mere covenant—or ‘a guarantor of 
men’s rights against one another’; it should be a rule of life that will make 
the member of the polis good and just” (37). No wonder that, in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, social critiques try to translate these thoughts 
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into their revolutionary visions. It is the ancient republican ideal of the citi-
zen in which private and public harmoniously reinforce one another. 
For Michael Novak, liberalism in this sense has been embodied in the Amer-
ican experiment, which “made central to the conception of the common good 
the protection of individual rights” (57). The American founders did not try to 
impose a “moral-cultural system” from the top down, but left the construction 
of such a system to institutions wholly distinct from government (the press, 
churches, universities, and the like). They also legitimated a new type of eco-
nomic system, promoted and regulated by the political system but “free to a 
degree unprecedented in history from the domination of the state” (57).
It is here where a revised understanding of the common good is happening. 
The most potent instrument of achieving it is not the state but the society 
at large, and not the solitary individual, but “the communitarian individual.” 
The ongoing question is how self-interest and faction can be made to serve 
the public good. But the old phrase “common good rightly understood” 
means achieving it for a particular community, at a particular moment, not 
the common good for all times and places. 
Aristotle’s description challenges today’s liberalism to define itself not in 
terms of the individual but as a social system. The ancient Athenian model 
of democracy is a reminder of the need for republican virtues in a people 
who aspire to be free.
4.
The Athenian democrats also showed a remarkable appreciation on the 
value of justice, rule of law, and due process. Self-imposed restraint was un-
derstood as essential for social communication. “If the law is properly cre-
ated within the framework of the common life, it legitimately commands 
obedience” (Held 50). In contrast to later liberal positions, Athenian de-
mocracy was marked by a general commitment to the principle of civic vir-
tue: dedication to the republican city-state and the subordination of private 
life to public affairs and the common good. There was no liberal distinction 
between state and society, between specialized officials and citizens, or be-
tween “the people” and government: 
In this community the citizen had rights and obligations, but these rights were 
not attributes of private individuals and these obligations were not enforced 
by a state dedicated to the maintenance of a framework to protect the private 
ends of individuals. Rather ... they were “public” rights and duties. (50)
Unlike the modern liberal separation between public sphere and private 
life, Athenians thought that the most desirable life was the life in a polis, 
where each citizen as a political being found ultimate fulfillment through po-
litical participation and public debate. The principle of government was the 
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principle of a form of lifelong direct participation. The governors were to be 
governed. The process of direct and active self-government was the ultimate 
affirmation of Athenian citizenship. 
The Athenian drama competition was an essential part of ancient Athens’ 
machinery of government. Its ideals—equality among citizens, liberty, and 
respect for the law and justice—have had great influence in the Western 
political thought, although there have been new central ideas added dur-
ing the course of history—for instance, that human beings are “individuals” 
with “rights.” This, notably, cannot be directly traced to Athens. Today’s un-
derstanding means that the individual has a capacity for freedom, for real-
izing himself/herself in the course of his/her actions, and that “he [sic] has 
inherent rights over and against the demands of any community to which 
he [sic] may belong” (Berger 1973). Berger says that, in the modern world, 
democracy may well be the most practical way to safeguard differing tradi-
tions and values because of the “breathing space” it allows individuals and 
institutions other than the state. Western democracy has been founded on a 
specific understanding of the individual as a bearer of inalienable rights. To-
day’s concept of the individual as an autonomous being (Berger 1973, 1999) 
historicizes the Ancient experience, including the critique of the great minds 
of Ancient Greece—Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Thucydides, which saw doz-
ens of democratic cities perish from inefficiency, stupidity, and corruption. 
We remember that Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote The Social Contract (1762) 
because he discovered (for his time) that the Athenian democracy was too 
good for men as they are. But the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the 
United States Constitution, the German Grundgesetz, or the European Sys-
tem of Laws, just to name a few examples, where character, habits, religion, 
economic base, and education of each people are being taken into account 
before setting up any constitutional machinery, constitute the convergence 
of two cultural streams: the first, originating in biblical religion, with Protes-
tantism playing a decisive role in its application to political democracy; the 
second, rooted in the Hellenic view of man, transmitted to modernity via the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and applied to the invention of demo-
cratic institutions by the French Revolution and its successors. 
We—who work as actors, directors, or scholars with Ancient drama—won-
der, sometimes, about the divergent viewpoints in the recent debate as to 
whether democracy is an ideal specifically rooted in the Western experience 
or whether its values are more universally valid. While it is not difficult to 
connect the rise of democratic institutions with specifically western histori-
cal experiences, there are also points of contact to be made with institutions 
in non-western societies. I know no example where the performance of an 
ancient Greek drama did not re-affirm the need for more “breathing space” 
on the part of he audience. Ancient Greek drama teaches us to restrain the 
actions of the rulers. It is full of subversive energy against the suppressors 
of the individuals’ rights of liberty, freedom, and justice. Benno Besson’s 
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Peace in the sixties, in East Berlin, de-masked the state’s justification of the 
erection of the wall. Dimitris Rondiris’ Electra, with Aspasia Papathanassiou 
in the lead, in the same place, as guest performance, brought a timelessness 
on the stage, which was in sharp contrast with the official aesthetic ideology. 
And my own Suppliant Women, at the beginning of the eighties, demonstrat-
ed for a young audience what the so-called “socialist democracy,” including 
the freedom of speech, is missing. The victory of western democratic values 
over the totalitarian dictatorships in 1989 in Europe demonstrated to the 
whole world why and how democracy is, under modern conditions, the only 
practical alternative to tyranny. 
5.
What is needed, Max Horkheimer said in a 1942 essay, is “the Greek polis 
without slaves.” The crux of many of the critiques within western democracy 
is that the participatory democracy of the polis was erected on the basis of 
the lack of freedom of slaves and of women and of contempt for even the 
free manual laborer. “The best state,” Aristotle had said on that last count, 
“will not make the manual worker a citizen.” The vague hint that Aristotle 
had defined such a possibility in his discussion of the “states of Daedalus,” 
which would come into existence sometime in the future with automation, is 
not “fact” enough, to explain why, as Orlando Patterson puts it, “[s]lavery, 
freedom, and empire, like father, bride, and groom, marched to the altar 
of Athena together” (118). Sociological activists and ideological strategists 
comment as one: “The psyche of democratic Greece, then, was permeated by 
antidemocratic assumptions” (Harrington 34). But why look back to such a 
tarnished ideal? Because the ancient Athenians, at their best, built a political 
system in which there was no bureaucracy, no state looming over the citizen, 
but a culture of participatory and social commitment—resting, it is true, on 
that so-called immoral foundation. The forms of Athenian politics, in short, 
have a value that can be detached from their historical base, particularly, if 
we agree, that “the parts of the machine are not detachable” (Barzun 12). 
In order for the ancient Athenian democracy to work properly, there were 
several important conditions. Robert Dahl summarizes six elements. First, 
“citizens must be sufficiently harmonious in their interests so that they can 
share, and act upon, a strong sense of a general good that is not in marked 
contradiction to their personal aims and interests.” Second, citizens must 
also be homogeneous with respect to those characteristics (such as the 
amount of wealth and leisure time) for which wide differences might create 
instability and sharp conflicts regarding public good. Third, “the citizen body 
must be quite small, ideally even smaller than the forty to fifty thousand of 
... Athens.” Fourth, citizens must be able to assemble and directly debate 
issues of legislation and render judicial judgment. The Athenians found it 
difficult to conceive of representative government, much less to accept it as 
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a legitimate alternative to direct democracy. Fifth, self-government not only 
entailed meetings in the Assembly, it also meant citizen participation in the 
administration of the city-state. Most Athenians served as a public official 
at least once during their life time. Sixth, city-state should remain “fully au-
tonomous”: leagues, confederacies, and alliances should not be allowed to 
preempt the sovereignty of the Assembly of the city-state (Dahl 18-19).
The ancient Athenians’ “habits of the heart” are unique and indefinable; 
their organism of democracy is in fact indescribable, because it does not 
show others how to do it, but it models for observers a habit of self-help. 
What Jacques Barzun clarifies for the most modern democracy, the United 
States, should count for the western world’s oldest democracy, ancient Ath-
ens, too: 
[F]irst, democracy has no theory to export, because it is not an ideology but 
a wayward historical development. Second, the historical development of de-
mocracy has taken many forms and used many devices to reach the elusive 
goal called human freedom. Third, the forms of democracy in existence are 
today in a state of flux. (12)
Those who wish to adopt classically liberal political systems for their coun-
tries will have to learn that that it is more difficult than it might appear. 
By confronting the present results of democracy with the ancient Athenian 
achievements, the importance of the individual person in the social process 
of democratization becomes obvious. It is one thing to structure a liberal 
government, but it is quite another, and much harder, task to develop the 
kind of citizenry fit for a democratic regime. The comparison is a reminder 
of the need for democratic virtues in a people who aspire to a free and lib-
eral political order—these include such virtues as enterprise and responsibil-
ity for one’s self.
Our problem today is that freedom calls for a government that governs 
least; equality for a government that governs most. No wonder that the in-
stitutions of the free world are under strain and its citizens under stress. 
The theorem of democracy still holds, but all of its terms have changed in 
nature, especially the phrase “the people,” which has been changed beyond 
recognition by the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century and the 
social revolution of the twentieth century. If free persons do have primacy, 
then, the common good can be only something that emerges from acts taken 
by free persons.
6.
Notwithstanding its critics, however, the ancient Athenian democracy re-
mains a legacy from which our present and future generations can learn a 
great deal. Its theatre reinforced the existing social structure and celebrated 
Athenian democracy. But it was also a theatre of questions. The playwrights 
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recognized that life is full of contradictions and that the future can be nei-
ther predicted nor controlled. The dramas that have come down to us call 
the community to account for its actions and charge individuals with respon-
sibilities for their choices.
Let me return to the example of Bacchae. An integral part of the text’s mean-
ing is contributed by the target audience. The question for us is: how could the 
community of Athenian believers accept that Dionysus had caused a mother 
to dismember (sparagmós) her own son? Even if both Agave and Pentheus had 
committed the most tremendous sins—slander of the god and theomachy, that 
they did not deserve such cruelty is not only the opinion of a twenty-first cen-
tury audience. This is not a matter of coexistence of creativity and destruction, 
but of sheer disproportion. Cadmus—who is punished despite being the only 
one to have protected Semele’s honor—concludes: “We have learned. But you 
punish us too harshly” (Bacc. l.1346). The Athenian audience—possibly on the 
brink of a religious revolution—could not have accepted a god who so wildly 
ran against the democratic and civic values of the city.
Euripides certainly inverted the structure of tragedy: instead of linking the 
god with value, he associated him with anti-value. How can a god plan such a 
terrible double vengeance on mother and son and yet claim divinity? Cadmus 
concludes: “Gods should be exempt from human passions” (Bacc. l.1348). 
The same structure is found in Hippolytus and The Trojan Women, in which 
Aphrodite, Artemis, and Athena reveal their unfitting human drives. Within 
the framework of an art which addresses large and heterogeneous audiences, 
which presupposes a—not necessarily sophisticated—response in unison, the 
theatre essentially reflects patterns of psychological response that, mainly, 
boil down to reaffirmation or refutation of held beliefs. “Relativism” was 
no choice. The ethic and moral principles of Athenian democracy provided 
certain procedural constraints and made demands on all participants.
Therefore, to the Greek audience the odes were a crucial part of the play. 
They set the norms of communication: norms of respect for persons, uni-
versal human and civic rights, and egalitarian reciprocity that govern such a 
theatrical situation. The chorus, representing the community’s Elders, who, 
in the fictional theatre world, are deeply concerned with the fate of the city, 
guaranteed equal opportunity to all participants—performers as well specta-
tors—to take part in the societal discourse, to contribute to it, and to be free 
from coercion, be it ever so subtle or covert. Although the chorus also per-
formed the priestly function of speaking for and to the gods in the real world 
of the audience, it reminded the characters and audience how to sustain 
those “normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned 
but fair agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue” (Benhabib 38). 
Aristophanes expressed the Greek perception of the Chorus when he wrote 
in The Frogs’ Parabasis: 
There is no function more noble than that
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of the god-touched Chorus
Teaching the City in Song. 
This tradition of spiritual teaching in Greek tragedy is centered in the choral 
odes. Its relevance for today’s theatre is that it “speaks the truth for the im-
provement of the city”: a challenge the twenty-first century theatre faces if it 
strives for a faithful description of reality.
Professor
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